Police departments are under increasing pressure to produce positive results to make the streets safe to walk and free of crime. Meeting these demands has produced new strategic consequences for police departments. According to noted criminologist George Kelling, “the main consequence is that police strategy shifts from a reactive and inherently passive model to a preventive interventionist model” (Kelling, 1999). This new mandate also changes the way police go about their business. In short, it serves as a catalyst for new approaches and programs in policing.

One common strategy for increasing the prevention efforts of police is to put more police on the streets. Sherman (1995), however, points out, “there is growing evidence that the number of police on the streets is far less important than the tasks that police perform.” Most studies on the effects of the number of police show that crime rates actually increase with an increase in the number of police. In fact, a recent review of 36 correlational studies found little evidence that more police results in reduced crime (Marvell and Moody, 1996). Instead, current research suggests that a police presence or visibility can affect the crime rate in specific places at specific times, depending on what actions the police are taking. In fact, Sherman concludes that if the police attack the risk factors for crime—such as guns on the street and “hot spot” street corners—then they could make a substantial difference (Sherman, 1995).

THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Sherman and his colleagues (1997) outline the seven major crime prevention techniques used by the police. These include

■ Rapid Response: The shorter the time it takes for police to arrive at an incident, the less crime will occur.

■ Reactive Arrests: The more arrests police make in response to reported or observed crime, the less likely it is that crime will occur.

■ Random Patrol: Random patrol creates an impression that the police could be anywhere, thereby reducing the likelihood of crimes being committed.

■ Community Policing: The more and better quality contacts between police and citizens, the less crime will occur.

■ Problem-Oriented Policing: The better police can identify and minimize the proximate causes of crime, the less likely that crime will occur.

■ Directed Patrols: Directing patrols at “hot spots” will reduce crime in those places.

■ Proactive Arrests: The higher the police-initiated arrest rate for high-risk offenders, the lower the crime rate will be for serious and violent crime.

Response times, reactive arrest, and random patrol used to be the three main strategies of the modern police department. Today, however, these strategies are quickly becoming things of the past. Theoretically, rapid response should prevent injury, increase arrest, and deter crime. But in practice, rapid response does none of these because during a crime, injury is often caused within the first few seconds, and by the time the police are summoned and respond (no matter how long it takes them to get there) the perpetrator normally is gone. This neither increases arrest nor deters future crime. In fact, one study found that the immediate response to serious crimes in progress results in an arrest for only 2.9 percent of serious crime calls and the prospects for increasing that rate are small since much of the time lag results from the time it takes the victim to contact the police. In many cases, victims wait more than 5 minutes before contacting the police (Spelman and Brown, 1981).

Another typical policing strategy, which many consider unencouraging, is reactive arrests. The deterrence theory of reactive arrests suggests that if police make more arrests in response to observed and reported crime, the individual (individual deterrence), as well as others (general deterrence) will be less likely to commit future crimes. However, most studies (Klein, 1986; Huizinga and Esbensen, 1992) examining the effect of reactive arrests suggests that “the results are consistently negative for juveniles” (Sherman et al., 1997). In other words, arrested juveniles increased recidivism compared with those not arrested.

Random patrol is another stalwart of policing strategy. However, random patrols have increasingly been attacked on the basis that they are not an efficient use of police resources. Klockars (1983) extends the criticism of random patrols by concluding that “it makes about as much sense to have police patrol routinely in cars to fight crime as it does to have firemen patrol routinely in fire trucks to fight fire.” Evidence to support this view was obtained from the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment in the early 1970’s. The experiment systematically compared crime rates in three groups of patrol beats. One group was given two or three times as much patrol coverage as usual. The second group had patrol entirely withdrawn, except to answer calls for service. Finally, the third group was left unchanged to act as a control. The results indicated no difference in the crime rate (Kelling et al., 1974).

In summary, hiring more police, increasing response time, unfocused random patrols, and reactive arrests do not significantly prevent serious crime. Yet several relatively new policing strategies appear to be successful at preventing crime. These strategies are presented below.

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING
Community policing is essentially a collaboration between the police and the community to identify and solve community problems. It is not a single coherent program, but rather a variety of programs all resting on the assumption that policing must involve the community. Subsequently, community policing takes various forms, but there are five fundamental elements: 1) a belief in a broad police function; 2) the reliance of police on citizens for authority, information and collaboration; 3) the application of general knowledge and skill; 4) specific tactics targeted at particular problems rather than general tactics such as preventive patrol and rapid response; and 5) decentralized authority to better respond to neighborhood needs.

According to Sherman and his colleagues (1997) the crime prevention effects of community policing occur in four major ways. First, the surveillance of residential neighborhoods by the residents themselves deters crime because offenders know people are watching. Second, police can gain intelligence about crimes through informal contacts with neighborhood residents. Third, the free flow of information from police back to residents improves the residents ability to protect themselves and, consequently reduces the likelihood of crime. Finally, a trust between the police and citizens will foster public confidence in the police and thus reduce the likelihood of crime. The evidence regarding each of these hypothesis is mixed (Sherman et al., 1997). For example, Macdonald (2002) finds that simply adopting a community policing plan and providing training to officers does little to reduce violent crime. In addition, research on foot patrols found no effect on overall crime or violent crime (Bowers and Hirsch, 1987; Esbensen, 1987; Pate, 1986; Pate and Annan, 1989). However, two single-site studies found that beats in which officers made door-to-door contacts with citizens experienced notable declines in reported violent crimes (Ucida, Forst, and Annan, 1992). Research by Skogan (1994) also found that home visits by the police reduced victimization.

More recently, the most ambitious community policing program was developed in Chicago in 1993. The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) incorporates aspects of both community and problem-oriented policing (see “Problem-Oriented Policing,” below). The community-oriented approach is implemented by dividing patrol officers into beat teams and rapid response teams in each of the districts. Beat teams spend most of their time working their beats and with community organizations, while rapid response teams concentrate their efforts on excess or low-priority 911 calls. This structure enables officers to respond quickly and effectively to problems that they were not traditionally trained to handle. “The process results in a plan of coordinated efforts between police and residents to reduce crime” (Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1999). The problem-solving strategy is implemented by training officers and residents through problem-solving techniques.

Skogan (1996) used a quasi-experimental design based on the differential changes in views and experiences of two groups over time to evaluate the prevention efforts of the CAPS program. Data was gathered from survey interviews with a random sample of residents. The first survey took place during April and May 1993. The respondents were again interviewed 18 months later, in order to measure changes in their perceptions of crime. The evaluation revealed evidence of improvement in every program area. The victimization component revealed a decrease in auto thefts in one district and street crime in another. Reports of drug and gang problems declined in two of the worst areas, as did the perceptions of physical decay. Graffiti went down significantly in the area where it was found to be the biggest problem.

PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING
Problem-oriented policing is a departmentwide strategy aimed at solving persistent community problems. Police identify, analyze, and respond to the underlying circumstances that create incidents. The theory behind it is that underlying conditions create problems (Goldstein, 1979). Thus officers use the information gathered in their responses to incidents, together with information obtained from other sources, to get a clearer picture of the problem (Eck and Spelman, 1987). The traditional conceptual model of problem solving, known as SARA, follows these four steps:

■ Scan: Identify problems and prioritize them incorporating community input.

■ Analyze: Study information about offenders, victims, and crime locations.

■ Respond: Implement strategies that address the chronic character of priority problems by thinking “outside the box” of traditional police enforcement tactics and using new resources that were developed by the city to support problem-solving efforts.

■ Assess: Evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy through self-assessments to determine how well the plan has been carried out and what good has been accomplished.

This process provides for a fresh uninhibited search for alternative responses. Some examples of alternative solutions include 1) target hardening (i.e., reducing opportunities); 2) changes in government services; 3) providing reliable information to residents; 4) providing police officers with specialized training; 5) community resources; 6) increased regulation; 7) city ordinances; and 8) zoning. In summary, the process represents a new way of looking at the police function. It is a way of thinking about policing that stresses the importance of the end product rather than the means.
The Problem-Oriented Policing Project conducted in Newport News, Va., provides evidence that suggests problem-oriented policing is more effective than traditional policing. The Newport News Task Force designed a four stage problem solving process: Scanning; Analysis; Response; and Assessment. An evaluation of the project revealed that officers and their supervisors identified problems, analyzed, and responded to these problems by applying the process. The number and diversity of the problems tackled showed that officers can solve problems routinely. The evaluation also showed that the problem solving process is effective. In one case, burglaries in the New Briarfield Apartment complex were reduced by 35 percent. In another example of problem solving, robberies in the central business district were reduced by 40 percent (Eck and Spelman, 1987). Other successful examples include using problem-oriented policing to reduce gun carrying in public (Sherman et al., 1995; Kennedy et al., 1996), alcohol consumption (Putnam et al., 1993) and prostitution (Mathews, 1993).

A more recent example of the problem-solving approach is Operation Ceasefire, which was designed to reduce illegal gun possession and gun violence in the community. Operation Ceasefire is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy (which also includes the Boston Gun Project and Operation Night Light) implemented in Boston to address escalating violent crime rates. It consists of a combination of aggressive law enforcement and prosecution efforts aimed at recovering illegal handguns, prosecuting dangerous felons, increasing public awareness, and promoting public safety and antiviolence campaigns. The goals of the program are to implement a comprehensive strategy to target, apprehend, and prosecute offenders who carry firearms, to put others on notice that offenders face certain and serious punishment for carrying illegal firearms, and to prevent youth from following the same criminal path. The program has two main elements: 1) a direct law enforcement attack on illicit firearms traffickers supplying youth with guns and 2) an attempt to generate a strong deterrent to gang violence (known as pulling levers).

The direct law enforcement tactics confront the illicit market supplying youths with firearms first by gathering statistics and interviewing youths to identify the types of guns they used and then by developing strategies to disrupt the illegal gun trade in the city (i.e., tracing the identification of all firearms confiscated from youths).

The pulling levers strategy, by contrast, involves deterring violent behavior by reaching out to gangs and setting clear standards for their behavior. When violations occurred, police pulled every “lever” legally available in response. The strategy began with focused communications. Probation and gang unit police officers who knew the youth, streetworkers, clergy, and community-based organizations met informally and formally with gang youth in schools, homes, neighborhoods, courthouses, and other locations to stress the message that violence in Boston had to stop or the full weight of the law enforcement and criminal justice systems would be brought to bear on the perpetrators. When the warnings were ignored the authorities could choose from a host of levers, including the disruption of street drug activity, paying greater attention to low-level street crimes, serving outstanding warrants, cultivating confidential informants, delivering strict probation and parole enforcement, seizing drug property, applying stricter plea bargains, requesting stronger bail terms, or concentrating federal investigation and prosecution on the gangs.

Braga and his colleagues (2001) evaluated Operation Ceasefire using two separate methods: 1) a basic one-group time series design and 2) a nonrandomized quasi-experiment to compare youth homicide trends in Boston with youth homicide trends in other large U.S. cities. The key outcome variable is the monthly number of homicides on victims 24 and younger. The data were collected from the Boston Police Department’s Office of Research and Analysis. The youth homicide trends include data from 1991 to 1995 (pre-intervention) and 1995 to 1998 (post-intervention). The results provide evidence that Operation Ceasefire is a promising intervention for youth crime. The Ceasefire intervention was associated with a statistically significant decrease (63 percent) in the monthly number of youth homicides. Moreover, the trend comparison of other U.S. cities reveals that there is no national trend that explains the drop in youth homicide in Boston at the time of Operation Ceasefire.

PROACTIVE ARREST
Wilson and Kelling (1982) argue that disorder in the local community when it reaches a critical mass creates a potential for more serious crime and urban decay. For example, “if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken.” This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in run down ones. Window breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window breakers whereas others are populated by window lovers. Rather, one unrepaired broken window “signals criminals that no one cares, so breaking more windows costs nothing” (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Thus, untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder, and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things. Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. In response, the police must engage in order maintenance or proactive arrests in order to protect the community and establish control.

Four elements of the broken window’s strategy (i.e., zero-tolerance) explain its impact on crime reduction (Kelling and Coles, 1996). First, dealing with disorder puts police in contact with those who commit more serious crimes. Second, the high visibility of police causes a deterrent effect for potential perpetrators of crime. Third, citizens assert control over neighborhoods thereby preventing crime. And finally, as problems of disorder and crime become the responsibility of both the community and the police, crime is attacked in an integrated fashion.

Most evidence generally supports the use of proactive arrests as a crime prevention tool. Specifically, proactive arrest has been successful in re-arresting repeat offenders and reducing drunk driving while it also supports the broken windows hypothesis. The evidence comes from two strong evaluations (Martin and Sherman, 1986; Abrahamse et al., 1991) of police units aimed at repeat offenders. A study in Washington, DC, employing pre-arrest investigations was designed to catch offenders in the act of crime to enhance the strength of evidence. Another study in Phoenix, Ariz., employing post-arrest investigations was designed to enhance the evidence in the offender’s latest case based on the length and nature of the offender’s prior record. Both projects aimed at increasing the incarceration rate of the targeted offenders, both succeeded” (Sherman et al., 1997). The evidence of proactive arrests to deter drunk driving has also been demonstrated to be an effective prevention tool. In fact, the ability of the police to control drunk driving appears to be in direct and linear function to the amount of effort they put into it (Homel, 1990).

DIRECTED PATROLS
Directed patrols are precision tools that focus patrol resources on the times and places with the highest risk of serious crime (i.e., hot spots). Rather than simply providing high police visibility, directed patrol concentrates police visibility where the crime is. The theory behind directed patrols suggest that the more police presence there is in hot spots the less likely crime will occur because it increases the threat of detection and punishment for criminal activity. In fact, evaluation findings suggest that police can reduce, or at least, displace, crime using directed patrols (Sherman and Weisbrud, 1992; McGarrell, Chermak and Weiss, 2002).

For example, the Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Experiment provided 3 hours a day of intermittent, unpredictable police presence to 55 randomly selected hot-spot intersections in the city. Another 55 hot spots received the normal patrol coverage. The results indicate that while the impact on all reported crime was small, it was statistically significant at 13 percent and even greater for more serious crimes. Further analysis indicates that the frequent rotation of the hot spot patrols, rather than long spells of patrol at one hot spot was more effective (Koper, 1992). The analysis showed that the longer the police stayed at one hot spot the lower the crime rate would dip––up to a point. More than 10 minutes of police presence in one hot spot produced diminishing returns. As a result. “the optimal way to use police visibility may be to have police travel from hot spot to hot spot, staying about ten minutes at each one” (Sherman, 1995).

Another successful example of the effectiveness of direct patrols is the Kansas City Gun Experiment. The Kansas City Police Department focused extra patrol attention on gun crime hot spots in targeted areas for 29 weeks. The officers involved in the strategy concentrated solely on gun detection through proactive patrol and did not respond to calls for service. The targeted beat was an 80'-by-10' block area with a 1991 homicide rate of 177 per 100,000 persons (20 times the national average). The program was based on the theory that additional patrols would increase gun seizure, which in turn, would also reduce gun crime because of either a deterrent effect or an incapacitation effect. The deterrent effect assumes that if police confiscate guns, illegal gun carriers would become less likely to carry them. The incapacitation theory suggests that if perpetrators of potential gun crimes had their guns seized, they would be unable to commit gun violence.

An evaluation of the strategy was conducted by Sherman and his colleagues (1995) at the University of Maryland. The evaluation used a before-and-after comparison design. The comparison beat was almost identical to the treatment beat. The only major difference was that the comparison beat had almost twice the population and three times the land area. The results indicate “that police can increase the number of seized guns in high gun-crime areas at a relatively modest cost” (Sherman et al., 1995). The major findings from the evaluation include

■ Gun seizures by police in the target area increased by more than 65 percent, while gun crimes declined in the target area by 49 percent.

■ Neither gun crimes nor guns seized changed significantly in the comparison beat.

■ There was no measurable displacement of gun crimes in surrounding beats.

■ Homicides showed a statistically significant reduction in the targeted area but not in the comparison area.

References

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